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Using panel data on U.S. MSAs, this paper estimates how a typical MSA’s wages of different
demographic groups, and prices,  are affected by overall MSA unemployment, the distribution of
unemployment among different groups, and national prices and wages. MSA unemployment has
strong effects on MSA wages and prices, but the distribution of unemployment among different
groups has weak effects on wages and prices. Using these estimates, simulations show that targeting
high-unemployment groups for unemployment reductions will not reduce wage or price inflation
pressures.  The estimates also show that the effects of MSA unemployment on prices and
disadvantaged groups’ wages are greater (in absolute value) at lower unemployment rates. As a
result, simulations using these estimates suggest that national unemployment can be reduced with less
inflationary pressures by targeting unemployment reductions at MSAs with high unemployment.1
1. Introduction
Some economic theories hold that overall unemployment could be lowered,  without
increasing inflation, by lowering relative unemployment among high-unemployment groups, such
as the less-educated. These theories assume that a group’s unemployment affects wages much
more when the group’s unemployment is low than when the group’s unemployment is high.
Under this assumption, the inflationary pressures from a reduction in unemployment among high-
unemployment groups can be offset by a smaller increase in unemployment among low-
unemployment groups.  
However, our empirical knowledge about how different groups’ wages respond to
unemployment is scant. Redistributing unemployment to reduce inflationary pressures may fail if
1) high-unemployment groups’ wages are more responsive to unemployment than are low-
unemployment groups, or 2) the wages of each group depend more on overall unemployment than
the group’s unemployment.  This paper estimates how wages of different groups respond to
group and overall unemployment. These estimates are used to simulate how lowering
unemployment in various ways affects wage and price pressures.
This paper’s estimates use wage, price, and unemployment data from 25 metropolitan
areas (MSAs), 1979-98. Wage curves are estimated under three different ways of dividing up the
MSA labor force, by race, education, and central city residence. 
The estimates show that lowering unemployment among high-unemployment groups
within an MSA does not reduce wage and price pressures. A group’s wages depend more on
overall MSA unemployment than on the group’s unemployment. Unemployment has greater1This is based on the discussion in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), p. 201, who also cite Hall (1977)
for a formal statistical analysis.
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effects on low-unemployment groups than high-unemployment groups. However, lowering the 
relative unemployment of high-unemployment MSAs does significantly lower inflation.
2. Theory
This paper assumes that wages are determined by “wage curves,” which relate wages to
unemployment. Empirical evidence for wage curves is provided by Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994).
A theoretical explanation of wage curves is offered by efficiency wage models. In such
models, firms offer wages above the level that clears the market because higher wages increase
profits. Higher wages may increase productivity by giving workers an incentive to avoid being
fired for shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Higher wages may lower firms’ turnover and hiring
costs by lowering worker quit rates and making it easier to hire qualified new workers (Salop
1979; Weiss 1980). Higher wages may be perceived as fairer by workers, leading to greater
worker effort (Akerlof 1982).
In efficiency wage models, higher unemployment may reduce the profit-maximizing wage.
With higher unemployment, shirking is less of a problem. Higher unemployment will lower quit
rates and make hiring easier. In a depressed economy, workers may see lower raises as fairer.
As pointed out by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), efficiency wage theories suggest
that wages should be more sensitive to unemployment at low unemployment than at high
unemployment.
1 For example, a reduction from two to one in the unemployment/vacancy ratio
makes it much easier for workers to find jobs and much harder for firms to find workers, whereas2Baily and Tobin also suggested that lowering relative unemployment among low-wage groups might
improve the unemployment inflation tradeoff because wages of different unemployment group indicate their
“effective labor supply,” which might determine wage and price pressures. The implicit model is that what really
matters for inflation is capacity utilization, not the labor market. As discussed later in this paper, I tested this
theory and find little support for it.
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a reduction from six to five in the unemployment/vacancy ratio would have little effects on the
odds of either workers or firms finding suitable job matches. At low unemployment, even a small
change in unemployment will have relatively larger effects on the profit-maximizing wage.
The nonlinearity of the wage curve suggests that lowering relative unemployment among
high-unemployment groups might allow lower overall unemployment with no increased inflation.
Suppose the wages of each group are largely determined by the group’s own unemployment. In
that case, one might expect the effects of unemployment on the high-unemployment group’s
wages to be lower simply because of its higher unemployment rate. Then the wage inflation
effects of a reduction in unemployment among high-unemployment groups could be offset by a
smaller increase in unemployment among low-unemployment groups.
Theoretical models of improving the unemployment/inflation tradeoff by lowering relative
unemployment of high-unemployment groups were developed some years ago by Baily and Tobin
(1977, 1978).
2 Such models provided the intellectual underpinning for policy recommendations
made in the late 1970s, but never enacted, to lower the “non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment” (NAIRU) by public service jobs or subsidized private jobs for the disadvantaged
(Palmer 1978; Haveman and Palmer 1982). Such policy approaches were rejected with the advent
of the Reagan administration. Recently, policy interest in creating jobs for the poor has increased,
in part as a response to the need of welfare recipients to find jobs given the 1996 welfare reform3 Okun later used these arguments to criticize the original Tobin and Baily (1977) paper; see Okun’s
comments on p. 577 of the discussion of the Tobin-Baily paper.
4 Baily and Tobin (1977) and Nichols (1982) estimate, using national time-series data, how the
unemployment of groups affects overall wages. But they do not estimate effects on the unemployment of different
groups.
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bill (see Ellwood and Welty [2000] for a review). It remains a relevant issue whether such job
creation efforts improve the unemployment/inflation tradeoff. 
However, there are some reasons to be skeptical about claims that the NAIRU can be
lowered by lowering the poor’s unemployment. First, as pointed out by Arthur Okun (1973),
wages of low-skill groups may be more responsive to unemployment than are the wages of high-
skill groups.
3 More skilled workers might be more important for firms to retain. As a result, firms
may be more likely to enter into long-term wage arrangements with more skilled workers, which
insulates the wages of these workers from cyclical changes in unemployment. Because firms have
less invested in less-skilled workers, they are more willing to  let their wages be determined by
unemployment.
Second, what is the relevant “group” unemployment rate for determining wages? If
mobility is “extensive enough” across a particular grouping of the labor force, then overall
unemployment will drive a group’s wages more than the group’s own unemployment. In this case,
redistributing unemployment among groups will not much change inflationary pressures.
This paper empirically tests some of these ideas by estimating wage curves for different
groups.  Previous research has failed to estimate how group wages respond to both group and
overall unemployment, and the implications this has for efforts to improve the
unemployment/inflation tradeoff.
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3. Model and Data
The model is estimated in six different versions, which differ in how the labor force is
grouped and in whether feedback from national variables is allowed. Each version of the model
has three equations, one to explain MSA prices and the other two to explain MSA nominal wages
for the two groups comprising the labor market. Local prices and wages are explained by lagged
prices and wages, by local overall unemployment and local unemployment of each group, and, in
some cases, by lagged national prices and wages. The model is estimated using pooled time-series
cross-section data, in which each observation is an MSA average for a particular year. Twenty-
five MSAs are included, as are all years from 1979 to 1998.  The models divide the labor market
into two groups in three different ways: white non-Hispanic vs. other races; college graduates vs.
non-graduates; central city vs. suburban residents.  Each of these three groupings is estimated in
two ways: 1) treating national effects as fixed effects, and 2) treating national effects as random
effects and including a lagged national wage or price variable in each equation if it is statistically
significant. All equations include MSA fixed effects. Simulations examine effects of changes in
group unemployment rates. Models with fixed effects implicitly assume that unemployment only
changes in this MSA. Models with national wage or price variables can be simulated under some
assumptions about how unemployment changes throughout the nation. A typical set of three
estimating equations in the model can be written as:
(1) lnPmt = A0 + A1(L)lnPmt-1 + A2lnWmt + A3fp(Umt) + Am + At [+A4lnPt-1] + epmt
(2)  lnWgmt = B0g + B1g(L)lnPmt-1 + B2g(L)lnWgmt-1 + B3g(L)lnWmt-1 + B4gfg(Ugmt) +
B5gfg(Umt) + Bgm + Bgt [+ B6glnWgt-1] + egmt6
The second equation stands for the two groups’ wage equations, with the dependent variable
being nominal wages in MSA m and year t for group g, with each group having its own
coefficients.  The first equation explains prices in MSA m and year t. Coefficients followed by an
(L) indicate that lags of the variable to the right are included. Several lags in local prices are
included in all three equations. Current wages are included in the price equation, and lags in both
group and overall wages are included in the group wage equations. For the price equation, some
functional form for overall MSA unemployment in the MSA is included, and in the group wage
equations, some functional form in both group and overall unemployment is included. All
equations include MSA fixed effects (Am or Bgm). All equations include either fixed national year
effects, or random national year effects, represented in either case by At or Bgt. If year effects are
random, the price model also includes lagged national prices, and the group wage equation for
college graduates also includes lagged national wages for that group. (These terms are bracketed
above to indicate that they only appear in some versions of the model.) National variables were
only significant for these equations but not for the other five group wage equations (see below for
details). The disturbance terms, represented by e, are assumed independent and identically
distributed.
Functional forms and lag lengths are chosen through experimentation. Table 1 summarizes
the final specifications. For unemployment in the price equation, I considered the following
functional forms: the unemployment rate (UR); ln(UR); 1/(UR); 1/(UR)
2; (UR)
2. For each
functional form of unemployment, I considered just entering the current value, just entering the
value lagged one year, or entering the current and lagged values together. The chosen5 I also tested whether group unemployment rates help explain prices. The tests Baily and Tobin’s
hypothesis that a group’s unemployment has less effects on prices if the group’s wage right is low.  The group
unemployment rate was added in the same functional form and lag as overall unemployment. Unemployment of
either non-college graduates or central city residents is statistically insignificant in the price equation. “Other race”
unemployment variable is statistically significant. But lower “other race” unemployment, holding overall
unemployment constant, is estimated to increase prices, which contradicts Baily and Tobin’s hypothesis. For
consistency purposes, I chose to only include overall unemployment in the price equation in all six versions of the
model. It is hard to explain why lower relative unemployment of a low-wage group would have greater price
effects. Allowing for the effects of “other race” unemployment on prices would only strengthen this paper’s finding
that targeting unemployment reductions at high-unemployment groups does not reduce inflation.
6 These tests were done at a much earlier stage of the research, before 1997 and 1998 CPS data were
available. The employment to population ratio was calculated for persons between 16 and 64 years old. At this
early stage, I considered the same functional forms for both employment to population ratios and unemployment,
but only the following lag specifications: current variables only; lagged variables only; and the average of current
and lagged variables.
7
specification was the lag of (1/UR), which minimized the Akaike Information Criterion, a standard
model selection criterion.
5  
For each of the six group wage equations, I considered the same alternative specifications
as in the price equation for unemployment, except that each wage equation included both overall
unemployment and that group’s unemployment. Although the specification varied across the six
groups, in each equation I assumed that overall and group unemployment followed the same
functional form and lag.  The chosen specifications minimized the AIC. As shown in Table 1, for
disadvantaged groups, the chosen specifications imply that unemployment has greater effects on
wages at low unemployment than high unemployment, whereas for advantaged groups,
unemployment has similar or smaller effects at low unemployment than high unemployment.
Preliminary tests for the price equation and the two wage equations for racial groups
considered the employment-to-population ratio as an alternative to the unemployment rate. The
best-fitting functional form from these employment-to-population ratio specifications was always
clearly inferior to the best fitting functional form from the unemployment rate specifications.
6 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) also found that local unemployment bested local-employment-to7 One exception was that seven lags in prices minimized the AIC for the suburban wage group. The AIC
minimizing lag lengths for the other groups were white, 4; other race, 3; non-college graduate, 4; college graduate,
1; central city, 5. 
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population ratios as a predictor of local wages. These results suggest that “unemployment,” as
compared to being “out of the labor force,” is a meaningful labor market distinction in
determining wage trends.
Other aspects of the specification also were subject to experimentation. I considered
entering from one to eight lags in the local price variable in each of the three equations. I ended
up choosing to enter five annual lags in the local price variable in all equations. This minimized the
Akaike Information Criterion for the price equation and generally exceeded the AIC minimizing
lag length for all of the wage equations.
7 Including five years of past prices is consistent with the
theoretical notion that price expectations may depend in a complicated way on recent price trends
and with empirical work using national data which finds that relatively long lags in price data help
explain inflation (e.g., Gordon 1998). 
For wage equations, I considered fewer lags, for two reasons: 1) because I have more
years of price data than wage data, including one more lag in wages requires sacrificing 25
observations, one for each MSA; and 2) evidence from national data suggests that fewer lags in
wages are needed to predict prices and wages (Gordon 1998, 1988). For the price equation, I
considered adding an additional lag in overall local wages, but it was clearly insignificant. For the
wage equations, I considered having from one to three lags in both group and overall wages. The
second lag in wages was statistically significant in some wage equations, but the third lag was8 Specifically, the F-test probabilities for the second lag in wages were white, 0.0548; other race, 0.4372;
less than college, 0.0215; college or more, 0.0042; central city, 0.8202; non-central city, 0.1869. The third lag in
wages never had an F-test with a probability less than 0.16.
9 For example, the national price lagged one period had a t-statistic of 3.11 in the price equation. For this
equation, I also looked at lagged national wages and the lagged national unemployment rate. The “best” national
variable was the national wage lagged one year, which had a t-statistic of 3.12. In the wage equation for college
graduates, the t-statistic on the national wage of that group is 2.82. In this equation, I also tried several
specifications that each entered a different national variable, including lagged national overall wages, lagged
national prices, and lagged national overall unemployment rate. The “best” t-statistic was for overall national
wages, the coefficient on which had a t-statistic of 2.83. 
10 For these various labor market groups, the relevant t-statistics for the coefficient for the lagged national
wage of that same group were 1.51 for the white non-Hispanic group; 1.40 for the other race group; 1.36 for non-
college graduates; 1.42 for central city residents; and 1.21 for suburban residents. I also tried the following other
9
never statistically significant.
8 Therefore, I included two lags in wages in all group wage
equations.
After I settled on the specifications with year fixed effects, I considered random effects
specifications with various national variables. Entering more than one national variable at a time
led to extremely imprecise results. This probably occurs because there are only 18 years of
national data (once a few years are dropped because of lags) with which to estimate the effects of
national variables. Therefore, I decided to only include a maximum of one national variable in
each equation. Entering lagged national prices in the price equation and each group’s lagged
national wage in the group wage equation is appealing because  inter-MSA trade and migration
would force local prices or wages to respond to changes in the same variable at a national level.
Some tests showed that no other national variables had significantly better explanatory power
than choosing one lag in the analogous national variable.
9  
National group wages were only statistically significant in the college graduate wage
equation. For the other five labor market groups (non-college graduates, the two racial groups,
the central city and suburban groups), national group wages were statistically insignificant, as
were other national variables.
10national variables: national overall wages lagged one year; national prices lagged one year; and the overall national
unemployment rate lagged one year. For these five labor market groups, the largest t-statistic on a national variable
was in the suburban resident wage equation, for which there was a t-statistic of 1.66 on national unemployment
lagged one year.
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These findings suggest that labor markets for most groups are in some sense
fundamentally local, in that local wages respond mainly to local trends in wages, unemployment,
and prices. National trends do have important indirect effects on these groups’ local wages by
influencing local prices and local unemployment. In contrast, local wages of college grads are
significantly affected by national wage trends. This may reflect the greater migration across MSAs
of the college educated compared to other labor market groups. For example, for individuals with
a college degree or more ages 25-64, 5.4% move into a typical MSA each year, whereas for
individuals with a high school degree or less ages 25-64, only 3.9 percent move into a typical
MSA each year (Series P20 figures for the 1996-97 period from the March 1997 CPS, U.S.
Census 1997, Tables 25 and 28). In addition, local prices are significantly influenced by national
price trends, which may reflect interregional trade.
Wage and unemployment data come from the Current Population Survey, Outgoing
Rotation Group (CPS-ORG). Both wage and unemployment data are calculated after excluding
observations that use imputations rather than actual survey responses. Wages are defined as usual
weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours. The wage data also screen out “outlier” wage
observations, which are defined as observations in which the real hourly wage (in 1979 dollars) is
less than $1 per hour, or more than $100 per hour, or in which the real wage is more than $40 per
hour and usual weekly hours are less than 10 hours. The wage mean for each MSA and year for
each group is a “regression-adjusted” mean. For each year, a preliminary regression was done of
wages on a set of predictors, including MSA and regional dummies, a fourth-order polynomial in11 I did some experimentation in using regression adjusted unemployment rates, and there appeared to be
no difference in the results, so I used the simpler unadjusted unemployment rates. On the other hand,
experimentation indicated that regression-adjusted wages explain local prices somewhat better than do unadjusted
wages.
12 The only real consequence of this adjustment is that it makes some slight difference in whether a few
observations are excluded as wage outliers, because the wage outlier analysis was done after all wages were first
adjusted to real wages using 1979 national prices.
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age, a set of six dummies for different education levels, discrete variables for whether the
individual was Black and whether the individual was Hispanic, a set of discrete variables for
whether the person was female or married, the interaction between female and married, and a
quadratic in the month of the observation. I then calculated for each group wage (as well as
overall), what the wage would be in that MSA and year, for an individual with characteristics
equal to the overall 1996 means for most of the variables, and the 1996 group means for other
variables. Group means were used in regression adjustment for variables that had to vary across
groups. For example, the mean of the discrete variables for Black and Hispanic must vary between
the “White non-Hispanic” group, and the “other race” group, so separate means were used for
these variables for those two groups. For unemployment, the weighted means of unemployment
were used without adjustment.
11
Price data were derived from the official CPI reported by BLS for each MSA. These
indices measure prices for each MSA relative to a base year for the MSA, not according to some
national standard. Although this is of no consequence because all estimation includes MSA fixed
effects, I did make some attempt to adjust all prices so they were expressed relative to national
prices in 1979.
12 This was done using BLS’s indices of comparative costs of a total consumption
basket for a lower living standard budget for a four-person family in 1979 (U.S. Department of
Labor 1980, Table 153). The lower living standard budget was used because it uses data on12
comparative rents rather than home ownership costs, and, as is well-known, price indices for
home ownership suffer from problems because of the investment aspects of the home ownership
decision.  In addition, the local prices indices in some of the earlier years were adjusted to a
“rental equivalence” basis using national level data comparing the CPIU-X1 price index to the
regular CPI-U index. This amounts to a fixed percentage adjustment in the inflation rate for all
MSAs in a particular year and is of no consequence in regressions that include a fixed national
year effect, and is probably not of much consequence when national effects are treated as random.
The 25 MSAs used are all those for which BLS consistently reports local price indices and
for which the CPS definitions are reasonably consistent over time. To make MSA definitions more
consistent over time, some MSAs were combined in some years for the CPS analysis. For
example, San Francisco and Oakland were combined in recent years because these MSAs were
combined in earlier years in the CPS. Despite these efforts, in some cases the MSA definitions in
the CPS do shift a bit, adding or subtracting a county from the MSA definition. These counties
added or subtracted are generally a small part of the MSA. If the counties included in the MSA
are truly one labor market, we would not expect these additions or subtractions to have dramatic
effects on regression-adjusted means of wage variables. Any measurement error that results is
presumably part of the noise in the regression. In addition, for 1998, Buffalo has been dropped
from the local CPI data, and Washington and Baltimore have been combined in the local CPI data.
I imputed the price index for Washington and Baltimore by assuming a uniform inflation in each
MSA’s price index equal to the increase in the overall Washington/Baltimore price index from
1997 to 1998. For Buffalo, I assumed that its 1997-98 inflation was equal to the inflation rate for
MSAs of its size in the Northeast. These imputations presumably add some noise to the 199813 The note to Table 3 provides the relevant formulas.
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dependent variable for the price equation (1998 values of prices do not enter the wage equations).
Reestimating the price equation with these two observations dropped did not change any results.
Table 2 lists means and standard deviations of unemployment and wages as well as overall
unemployment for each MSA as of 1998, the lowest unemployment year in the sample. These
data show the expected pattern of higher unemployment and lower wages for disadvantaged
groups. The data also emphasize that the variation in unemployment among MSAs and years is
large. Furthermore, recent unemployment in some MSAs has been quite low. This suggests that
these data may reveal how much inflation is caused by unemployment that is lower than the 1998
national unemployment rate of 4.5%. One problems in studies using national data is that it is
difficult to determine the inflation effects of unemployment as low as current levels, because we
have rarely experienced such low unemployment in recent years at the national level. This is not
true at the local level.
For some simulations, we want to know how group unemployment typically varies as
overall unemployment is reduced. Several methods might predict this.  Regressing one group’s
unemployment rate on the other’s is unsatisfactory, because such an equation implicitly assumes
that the shock to overall unemployment originates in one group. Regressing group unemployment
on overall unemployment is problematic because of differences in the labor share of different
groups in different MSAs and years. Instead, I assume that there is a fixed correlation between the
unemployment rates of different groups. With estimated covariances and variances of group
unemployment rates, one can derive an equation to predict each group’s unemployment given
overall unemployment.
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Table 3 reports what these estimated relationships imply for how group unemployment
rates vary as overall unemployment varies from 10% to 2%. These estimates are consistent with
the conventional wisdom that unemployment of the disadvantaged declines disproportionately as
overall unemployment is reduced. It is noteworthy that “other race” unemployment converges on
White unemployment as unemployment is reduced to 2%, and that central city unemployment
converges on non-central city unemployment as unemployment is reduced to 2%. In contrast, the
gap between unemployment rates of college graduates and non-graduates persists at low
unemployment rates. This suggests that labor market distinctions between groups by education
level are in this respect more fundamental than distinctions by ethnic group or residential location.
4. Results
I first consider models with fixed effects for each year. Such models fully control for
national trends. However, fixed effects models can only examine the effects of changes in local
unemployment, as national unemployment is implicitly held constant by the fixed year effects. To
allow for changes in national variables,  I also estimate models in which national year effects are
treated as random (MSA effects continue to be treated as fixed). With random national effects,
the models can estimate the effects of changes in national variables on local wages and prices.
This allows simulation of effects of changes in unemployment throughout the nation.  
Fixed effect models
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from fixed effects models. The most noteworthy
finding is that the group unemployment rates’ effects on group wages, holding overall15
unemployment constant, is always statistically insignificant at the conventional 5% level of
significance. On the other hand, each group’s wages are considerably affected by overall labor
market conditions. In five of the six wage equations, lagged overall wages have significant effects
on the current wages of each group, holding lagged wages of the group constant. In four of the
six wage equations, overall unemployment has significant effects on group wages, holding the
group’s unemployment constant. (In the other equations, the estimation is not precise enough to
tell whether either group or overall unemployment, considered separately, have statistically
significant effects on group wages). 
These results suggest that there is enough mobility across groups that different groups’
wages  respond more to overall MSA labor market conditions than to the unemployment rates of
the group. It is noteworthy that group unemployment rates come closest to statistical significance
for the wage equations for central city residents and suburban residents. Apparently geographic
barriers (information? transportation?) create labor submarkets that respond to their own
submarket unemployment trends, but differences in worker education or race by themselves are
insufficient to prevent groups from responding to overall labor market trends.
To show the dynamic response of wages and prices to lower  MSA unemployment, Figure
1 uses the estimated fixed effect models to simulate the effects of lowering overall MSA
unemployment from 6% to 4%. National unemployment is implicitly held constant. The relative
unemployment of different groups at 6% and 4% unemployment are derived from Table 3, and
therefore Figure 1 shows a “typical” pattern of group unemployment reductions when overall
unemployment is reduced. The three parts of the figure show three models, each segmenting the
labor force differently. 14Blanchflower and Oswald’s preferred estimate is that the elasticity of pay with respect to unemployment
is about -0.1. Most of their estimates use annual earnings rather than hourly wages. At initial unemployment of
6%, a reduction to 5% would increase the log of nominal earnings by 0.018.
15This is derived from Card’s Table 3, column 2.
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As the figure shows, unemployment reductions cause prices and real wages to increase,
settling down at a new higher level after about 10 years.  In all three models, a normal reduction
in overall unemployment – which includes a reduction in relative unemployment of the
disadvantaged—increases the relative real wages of the disadvantaged, although this effect is
slight in the race model. The overall increase in prices is similar in all three models, but the
increase in real wages is somewhat less in the race model. The lower real wage increases in this
model are due to lower real wage increases of the race model’s disadvantaged group.
Table 5 reports simulations of how MSA prices and real wages respond to various
patterns of lowering local unemployment among different groups. Table 5 shows effects after 10
years which, as shown in Figure 1, reveal long-run effects. For normal reductions in overall
unemployment by 1% (the right-most column), local prices go up by 1.2% to 1.4%. Overall real
wages go up by 0.9% to 1.6%, implying that nominal wages go up by 2 or 3%.  
These 2-3% effects on nominal wages after 10 years seem roughly compatible with the
wide range of previous estimates. Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1994) estimates imply that a
reduction from 6% to 5% unemployment will increase nominal annual earnings by 1.8%.
14 Their
focus on nominal earnings will overstate the effects of unemployment on nominal wages.
However, their model constrains the short-run and long-run effects on earnings to be the same,
which should understate the long-run effects of unemployment on wages. Card’s (1995) estimates
imply that a reduction from 6% to 5% unemployment will increase nominal hourly wages by
1.5%.
15 His specification, like Blanchflower and Oswald’s, constrains short-run and long-run16I derive this from column (3) of Table 2 in Blanchard and Katz (1997, p. 64). They report an effect of
log unemployment on log nominal wages of -0.041, and an effect of lagged wages on current wages of 0.911.
17
effects of unemployment on wages to be the same, which should cause this specification to
understate the long-run effects. Blanchard and Katz’s (1997) estimates imply that a reduction in
local unemployment from 6% to 5% will increase local nominal wages after 10 years by 5.4%.
16
Their specification only allows for dynamics by including one lag in wages. This dynamic
specification may overstate long-run effects on wages if wages adjust rapidly at first but then
much more slowly over time, as they seem to do in Figure 1.
When examining marginal reductions in unemployment of different groups, it is quickly
apparent that changing the distribution of unemployment does not much change price or real
wage effects.  Generally both groups’ wage rates go up when either group’s unemployment rate
goes down (an exception being that declines in college unemployment rates seem to have nil real
wage effects). Although relative wages of a group increase when its relative unemployment goes
down, these relative wage effects are modest. Wage trends for these groups are closely
interconnected.
As a result, as shown in Table 5, it makes little difference to prices and real wages whether
we lower group unemployment rates in the normal manner—which tends to lower the relative
unemployment of the disadvantaged—or instead lower both groups’ unemployment rates by the
same amount. In fact, lowering both groups’ unemployment by the same amount, which focuses
more of the unemployment reduction on advantaged groups, reduces slightly the price and real
wage effects of lower unemployment. 
To dramatize the smallness of the price effects of different distributions of unemployment,
Figure 2 considers two different patterns of lowering unemployment that differ drastically in how18
much unemployment of different groups is lowered. Pattern 1 was shown in Figure 1:  both
groups’ unemployment rates are lowered as they normally would be when unemployment is
lowered from 6% to 4%. In the other pattern, both groups’ unemployment rates are equalized at
4%, which requires substantial changes in relative unemployment.
Figure 2 shows that focusing more of the unemployment reduction on the disadvantaged
does not reduce price pressures, as Baily and Tobin conjectured. In fact, if anything, prices go up
slightly more when unemployment reductions are targeted on the disadvantaged. These slightly
greater price pressures may occur  because the wages of the disadvantaged are more responsive
to unemployment than are the wages of the advantaged, and these greater wage increases put
upward pressure on prices.
Figure 2 also shows that targeting unemployment reductions on the disadvantaged
increases the relative real wages of the disadvantaged. This reinforces the progressive
distributional effects of lower relative unemployment of the disadvantaged. Although targeting
unemployment reductions on the disadvantaged is not an anti-inflation tool, one can still support
such a policy on distributional grounds and argue that its extra price inflation effects are modest.  
A fuller picture of the effects of unemployment on local wage and prices requires looking
at the effects of a wider range of unemployment rates. Figure 3 plots the price and real wage
effects of changing from an overall unemployment rate of 6% to several overall unemployment
rates, ranging from 2% to 10%. Unemployment of different groups changes in the “typical”
fashion;  the effects shown are effects after 10 years, or “long-run effects.” The resulting plots can
be described as “price curves” or “real wage curves” that show the long-run response of price and19
real wage levels to unemployment. The plots can also be described as Phillips curves, as they
show the 10-year change in prices and real wages.
The price curves are similar in all three models. These price curves are clearly convex. An
unemployment reduction from 4% to 2% local unemployment causes a greater effect on prices
than a reduction from 10% to 4%. Real wage curves for the disadvantaged are also convex. These
convexities reflect the functional forms chosen to best fit the relationship between unemployment,
and prices and real wages of the disadvantaged.  On the other hand, wage curves for the
advantaged are linear or slightly concave, again reflecting the functional forms chosen to best fit
how unemployment affects the advantaged’s wages.  Particularly at low unemployment rates, real
wage curves for the disadvantaged are much steeper (more negatively sloped) than are real wage
curves for advantaged groups. This tendency is more pronounced in the education and city/suburb
models than in the race model. In the education model, real wages of the less-educated are much
more responsive to changes in local unemployment than are the more-educated at most observed
unemployment rates. The real wage rates of the college educated are relatively insensitive to local
unemployment. As mentioned above and again below, this may be explained by the greater
migration of the college educated, which links their real wage more to national trends.
Random effect models
I now presenting simulations derived from estimated random effects models.  Because
these random effects  models allow for the influence of national variables on local variables,
simulations using random effects models can examine what happens if unemployment changes
both in the local labor market and in the nation as a whole.17The Hausman tests (see Greene 1993, pp. 479-480) test for significant differences between the fixed
effects and  random effects estimates. Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality, both estimates are consistent but
the random effects estimates are more efficient, and the two sets of estimates should not differ significantly.
20
For the same variables, the random effects and fixed effects models yield similar
coefficient estimates. (The raw coefficient estimates for the random effects models  are reported
in appendix Table A1.) Hausman tests for whether the random year effects are
 orthogonal to the regressors always decisively accept the null hypothesis of orthogonality.
17
The two equations with statistically significant national effects are the equation predicting
local prices and the equation predicting local wages of college graduates. In the equation
predicting local ln(price level), lagged ln(national price level) has a coefficient of 0.121 (t-statistic
= 3.11). In the equation predicting local ln(wage of college graduates), the coefficient on lagged
ln(national wages of college graduates) is 0.282 (t-statistic = 2.82). As mentioned above, the
significant influence of national prices on local prices may arise from interregional trade. The
significant effects of national wages of college graduates on local wages may reflect the
interregional migration of college graduates.
Many types of simulations can be done with the random effects model. National variables
are set equal to the average of variables in local labor markets comprising the model. Simulations
can differ in the detail with which they model the many U.S. local labor markets and in what
pattern of local unemployment reductions is examined. The simplest and least interesting
simulation is to analyze an unemployment reduction in one MSA, with no unemployment
reductions elsewhere. If the MSA is small, there will be no significant change in national variables
(which is to say the national variables are held constant). Such a simulation should yield similar
estimates to the fixed effects model. Simulations not presented here show this to be the case.21
 A simple simulation approach that includes national effects in a meaningful way is to
assume that the United States is comprised of a number of identical MSAs, all of which
experience an identical unemployment reduction. In this case, the change in national variables will
be equal to the change in local variables, and these national variables will influence the change in
local variables next year. This simulation approach may be a reasonable summary of the typical
effects of lowering unemployment throughout the United States. In the real world, with diverse
initial unemployment rates, national wages and prices will be pushed up more by unemployment
reductions in low unemployment areas, where the greater upward wage and price pressures will
more than offset the lower upward wage and price pressures from reducing unemployment in
high-unemployment areas. On the other hand, typical national unemployment reductions probably
will lower relative unemployment in high-unemployment areas, which will reduce the wage and
price effects of lower national unemployment. These offsetting biases leave it uncertain whether a
real world national unemployment reduction will have more or less inflationary effects than a
uniform unemployment reduction in an imaginary world with identical MSAs. 
Under the simplifying assumptions of identical MSAs and uniform reductions in
unemployment in all MSAs, Figure 4 uses the random effects estimates to simulate the effects of
reducing national unemployment from 6% to 4% on prices and real wages in the nation as a
whole. There are several notable features of these simulation results. First, the effects on prices of
reducing unemployment everywhere are much greater than the effects on prices of reducing
unemployment in only one MSA (see Figure 1). For example, prices after 10 years go up almost
twice as much when unemployment is reduced everywhere than when prices are reduced in just18 Fair (1999) estimates a 10-year effect that 1 percent lower unemployment raises ln(price) by 0.031 in
his most flexibly estimated model. This is about half the effects of 2% lower unemployment that are reported in
Figure 4; directly estimating the effects of lowering unemployment from 6% to 5% in the education model used in
this paper yield an estimated effect on ln(price) of 0.030 (t-statistic of 5.20). A model that imposes the NAIRU
assumptions, which Fair rejects, estimate a 10 year effect of one point lower unemployment on ln(price) of 0.202.
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one MSA. These greater effects are largely due to the feedback effects from including lagged
national prices in the equation explaining local prices.  
Second, these estimated effects of lower unemployment on prices are significantly lower in
the long run than one would get in models using national data that impose the assumption of a
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (a NAIRU), but the effects are similar to price
effects in models using national data that estimate a more flexible functional form. For example,
Fair (1999) reports 10-year effects of lower national unemployment on prices that are quite
similar to those estimated here, but finds much greater effects when he imposes restrictions
(which are statistically rejected) that assume a NAIRU.
18
Third, lowering unemployment everywhere yields much more persistent effects on
inflation than lowering unemployment in just one MSA. As can be seen in the figure, the point
estimates suggest that lower unemployment causes inflation that persists throughout the 20-year
period considered, with inflation only slowly tapering off towards the end of the period. In
addition, the standard errors on these estimated effects increase as the length of the simulation
increases, so that it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that inflation is accelerating in response
to lower unemployment. For example, in the education model, the increase in ln(national price)
after 10 years is 0.069, and after 20 years is 0.123, but the standard error on the 20-year increase
in prices is 0.044, so the true 20-year increase in prices could be greater than twice the 10-year
effect.23
Fourth, with the exception of wages for college graduates, the effects of lower
unemployment on the level of real wages, and how those effects change over time, are quite
similar with unemployment decreasing everywhere (Figure 4) and just in one MSA (Figure 1).
Even though prices are steadily increasing in the Figure 4 model, real wages for most groups
reach a new equilibrium level after about 10 years. Real wages for most groups increase by about
1.5% to 4.5% in the long run, similar to the increases reported in the Figure 1 model. In the race
model and the city/suburb model, lower unemployment increases the relative wage of the more
disadvantaged group, although the effects are slight in the race model.
Fifth, in the Figure 4 model, the real wages of college graduates increase more and
continue increasing for a longer period than they do in the fixed effects model of Figure 1. These
much greater effects on college graduate wages are attributable to the feedback incorporated into
the model from national wages of college graduates to local wages. These effects on college
graduate wages are large enough that after eight years or so, lower unemployment is estimated to
have slightly greater effects on college graduate wages relative to non-graduate wages. However,
as indicated in the table below Figure 4, these estimated effects on college graduates are only
imprecisely estimated. It should be noted that even if lower unemployment did not have
progressive effects on the wages of non-graduates vs. college graduates, it still would increase the
relative employment and earnings of non-graduates vs. college graduates, because lower overall
unemployment drives down the relative unemployment rate of non-graduates vs. graduates.
As was done with the fixed effect model in Figure 3, the random effects model with
identical MSAs and identical unemployment everywhere can be used to generate “price
curves/wage curves.”  The curves resulting from these simulations are presented in this paper’s24
appendix. The resulting price and real wage curves look quite similar to those of Figure 3, except
that the absolute magnitude of all the price effects at different unemployment rates are higher, and
real wages of college graduates are more responsive to unemployment. However, price curves
and real wages curves for the disadvantaged are still convex, with considerably greater
responsiveness to unemployment at low levels of unemployment.
In addition, as was done with fixed effects models in Figure 2, the random effects model
with identical MSAs can be used to analyze whether inflationary pressures can be reduced by
targeting unemployment reductions more on disadvantaged groups. The results from this exercise
are also reported in an appendix. These results are very similar to what were obtained in Figure 2.
In general, targeting unemployment reductions more on high unemployment groups results in
slightly greater effects of a given overall unemployment reduction on the price level.    
Random effects models with national influences on local variables do allow us to address a
new issue: would targeting unemployment reductions on high-unemployment local labor markets
help reduce inflationary pressures? To address this issue, I consider a hyopthetical national
economy that is initially evenly divided into two types of MSAs: MSAs with 8% overall
unemployment; MSAs with 4% unemployment. Average national overall unemployment is thus
initially 6%. Simulations consider the effects of two different methods of lowering overall national
unemployment to 4%. Method 1 lowers every MSA’s unemployment rate by 2%, so that half the
MSAs now have 6% unemployment, and the other half have 2% unemployment. Method 2
equalizes unemployment in all MSAs at 4%.  
The results from these simulations are similar in all three models, so I present in the main
text the results from the city/suburb model and present results from the other two models in the25
appendix. As shown in Figure 5, targeting the unemployment reduction on the initially high-
unemployment MSAs greatly reduces inflationary pressures. For example, 10 years after the
unemployment reduction, the average ln(national prices) has increased by 0.098  when
unemployment is reduced evenly in all MSAs, but by only 0.050 when the unemployment
reduction is targeted at the high-unemployment areas. These differences largely reflect the non-
linear effects of local unemployment rates upon local prices, with local prices increasing far more
for a reduction from 4% to 2% than for a reduction from 6% to 4%. As shown in the bottom part
of the figure, targeting the unemployment reduction on high unemployment MSAs, compared to
lowering unemployment evenly everywhere, avoids a large boost to prices that occurs if one
lowers unemployment in already-low unemployment MSAs, at a more modest cost in increased
prices from a greater reduction in unemployment in high-unemployment MSAs. With feedback
between national prices and local prices, over time a targeting strategy even moderates somewhat
the price effects of lower unemployment in the targeted MSAs.  
5. Conclusion
This paper presents empirical estimates that suggest that different groups within a local
labor market experience similar wage trends in response to changing unemployment.  On the other
hand, local labor markets can show somewhat different wage trends from the nation. As a result,
policies to restrain upward wage and price pressures can do more through redistributing
unemployment among regions than across groups within the same labor market.
Does this mean that there is no scope for reducing upward wage and price pressures by
targeting more demand pressures on particular groups within a local labor market? Such a26
conclusion extrapolates the results too far. The wage curve models estimated in the paper, and in
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), find that wages depend on unemployment, not employment-to-
population ratios. An employment policy that targeted non-labor force participants might increase
employment with less inflationary pressures than “normal” employment increases. However,
targeting non-labor force participants for employment is probably a more difficult policy than
simply encouraging the employment of the disadvantaged who are unemployed. Such employment
policies must be more selective in choosing who is hired for public service jobs, or subsidized in
private sector employment.27
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Local Unemployment and Wage Data, 1979-98, 
25 MSAs
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations
Proportion of labor
 force, average across
 25 MSAs, 1979-98
Mean of MSA
unemployment rates, all
years and MSAs (St.
Dev.)
Mean of MSA ln(adjusted
real wage), in 1979





























Note: The means here are “means” of means, that is they are unweighted means and standard deviations across
observations on MSA-year means for 25 MSAs and all years from 1979-98. The underlying data are calculated
from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group, as described in the text. The unadjusted means for unemployment for 
each MSA-year are calculated using CPS sampling weights. The regression-adjusted means for ln(wage rate) are
based on preliminary regression of ln(real wage) on a variety of wage predictors.
Panel B: 1998 MSA means for overall unemployment rate
MSA 1998 unemployment rate MSA 1998 unemployment rate
Atlanta 2.9% Miami 7.0%
Baltimore 5.3 Milwaukee 3.4
Boston 2.6 Minneapolis/St. Paul 1.8
Buffalo 2.9 New York 6.2
Chicago 5.0 Philadelphia 5.2
Cincinnati 3.8 Pittsburgh 4.2
Cleveland 3.1 Portland (OR) 4.8
Dallas 3.8 St. Louis 5.0
Denver 3.1 San Diego 5.5
Detroit 4.2 San Francisco 3.9
Houston 4.2 Seattle 2.8
Kansas City 3.4 Washington D.C. 3.2
Los Angeles 6.8
Note: The official national unemployment rate in 1998 was 4.5%. The simple mean across these 25 MSAs in 1998







Other race UR 
(slope = 1.92)
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2% 2.1 1.8 2.3 1.1 2.1 2.0
3% 2.7 3.8 3.6 1.5 3.5 2.7
4% 3.3 5.7 4.8 1.9 5.0 3.4
5% 4.0 7.6 6.0 2.3 6.5 4.2
6% 4.6 9.5 7.3 2.7 7.9 4.9
7% 5.2 11.4 8.5 3.1 9.4 5.7
8% 5.9 13.4 9.7 3.5 10.9 6.4
9% 6.5 15.3 11.0 3.8 12.4 7.1
10% 7.1 17.2 12.2 4.2 13.8 7.9
Note: The numbers in the above table are calculated assuming that there is a constant correlation between the different group unemployment rates.  Suppose
that we are trying to predict how the unemployment of two groups that encompass the labor force, g and h, will vary with overall unemployment.  This
prediction is implicitly holding constant the labor force weights of the two groups, Wg and Wh.  The prediction equation can be written as Ug = B0g + B1gU,
where U, overall unemployment, is defined as U = WgUg + WhUh.  Then B1g = Cov(Ug,U)/V(U).  If Ug and Uh have fixed covariances and variances, then
Cov(Ug,U) = WgV(Ug) + WhCov(Ug, Uh), and V(U) = (Wg)
2V(Ug) + (Wh)
2V(Uh) + 2WgWhCov(Ug,Uh).  Once we have determined B1g, B0g can be determined by
substituting in mean values of the unemployment rates in the prediction equation, and solving for B0g.  A similar exercise gives us the prediction equation for
Uh.  The covariances and variances of each pair of group unemployment rates were calculated using the residuals from a regression of each pair of group
unemployment rates on MSA and year dummies, using the complete sample of 25 MSAs from 1979-98.  By doing these calculations using the residuals, I am
implicitly calculating how group unemployment rates vary with overall unemployment, holding constant unobserved fixed MSA and year effects.  The weights
used for the labor force were the same ones reported in Table 2, and are based on the sum of the CPS labor force weights over all MSAs and years.  The mean
unemployment rates used to determine the intercept were weighted mean unemployment rates, using labor force weights, which are similar but not identical to
the unweighted means reported in Table 2.Table 4: Relevant Coefficient Estimates from Final Wage and Price Equation Models, Fixed National Year Effects
Observations are on MSA/year cell means for variables labor market variables.  Each column corresponds to one of the seven equations estimated. 
Dependent variable for equation is listed at the top.  Second row lists functional form for unemployment used on right-hand side of that equation.  Subsequent
rows list various right-hand side variables and give the estimated coefficients on these RHS variables in each equation, with t-statistics in parentheses.  All
equations also include dummies for each MSA and each year.  Last row lists relevant F-test probabilities in each equation for variables of a particular type.
Dependent variables in each of seven equations:
Mean ln(wage)
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Current ln (overall wage) 0.0634
(4.17)











(2.00)Table 4.  (Continued)
Dependent variables in each of seven equations:
Mean ln(wage)
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All UR variables 0.0001 0.0534 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
UR-group   0.6636 0.5662 0.3815 0.3466 0.1211 0.1336
UR-overall 0.0054 0.1491 0.5300 0.0001 0.0070 0.0051 0.0002
Wage-group 0.0037 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
Wage-overall 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0571 0.0001
Note: UR variables are defined as proportions, that is, are generally between 0.01 and 0.12.32
Table 5: Some Simulation Results From National Fixed Year Effect Models of the Effects
of Changes in Unemployment
All effects are effects after 10 years, with unemployment reduction considered to take place in year 0. t-
statistics are in parentheses. All simulations start with overall unemployment of 6%, with pattern across groups as
given in Table 3.
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Notes: t-statistics are psuedo t-statistics derived from 1000 repetitions of simulation, with mean estimated effect
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Figure 1: Effects on Local Prices and Real Wages of Lowering Local Unemployment from 6% to Four%, with “Normal” Pattern of
Lowering Unemployment Rates of Different Labor Market Groups
Effects on Local Prices and Real Wages After Ten Years of Lowering Unemployment from Six Percent to Four Percent, Each Group’s
Unemployment Declines “Normally”   (t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
Model grouping labor
 market by race
Model grouping labor 
market by education


























Notes: Disadvantaged group/advantaged group are other race/White non-Hispanic for race grouping; less than college graduate/college graduate for education grouping;
central city resident/suburban resident for geographic residence model.  In a normal decline in MSA unemployment from 6% to 4%, each group’s unemployment declines as
described in Table 3.  This implies disadvantaged group’s unemployment declines more than advantaged group’s unemployment declines.
                 Price
 ln(real wage) disadvantaged group







0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20



























0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20











0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20


































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20











0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Year After Unemployment Reduction
Figure 2: Price and Wage Effects of Lowering Local Unemployment from 6% to 4%, in Three Different Models, Using Two Different
Patterns of Lowering Unemployment: “Normal” Unemployment Reductions; Equalizing all Groups’ Unemployment at 4%
 Change in ln(price) from normal unemployment reduction
 Change in ln(price) from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%
              Change in ln(real wage) of disadvantaged group from normal unemployment reduction
              Change in ln(real wage) of advantaged group from normal unemployment reduction
              Change in ln(real wage) of disadvantaged group from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%
                     Change in ln(real wage) of advantaged group from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%Figure 2: (continued)
Effects on Local Prices and Real Wages After Ten Years of Lowering Unemployment From 6% to 4%, Two Different Ways of Lowering
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Note: Disadvantaged group/advantaged group are other race/White non-Hispanic for race grouping; less than college graduate/college graduate for education grouping;
central city residents/suburban resident fro geographic residence model.  In a normal decline in MSA unemployment from 6% to 4%, each group’s unemployment declines as
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Figure 3: Effect of Normal Variations in Unemployment on Prices and Real Wages
Notes: These estimates are derived from 24 simulations. Eight simulations are done for each of three models.  Each simulation starts at six  percent overall unemployment,
and changes overall unemployment to one of the following unemployment rates: 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 7%, 8%, 9%, and 10%.  Unemployment rates for each group vary in their
normal manner with overall unemployment, as describes in Table 3.  Effects reported are ten years after reduction in unemployment, which reflect long- run changes in
prices and real wages.
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Figure 4: Effects on National Prices and Real Wages of Lowering Unemployment in All MSAs from 6% to 4%, with            
“Normal” Pattern of Lowering Unemployment Rates of Different Labor Market Groups
Effects on national (=local) prices and real wages after 10 years of lowering unemployment in all MSAs from 6% to 4%, each
group’s unemployment declines “normally”, using random effects model (t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
Model grouping labor
 market by race
Model grouping labor
 market by education


























Notes: Disadvantaged group/advantaged group are: other race/White non-Hispanic for race grouping; less than college graduate/college graduate for education
grouping; central city resident/suburban resident for geographic residence model. In a normal decline in MSA unemployment from 6% to 4%, each group’s
unemployment declines as described in Table 3. This implies disadvantaged group’s unemployment declines more than advantaged group’s unemployment
declines. Model assumes United States is composed of identical MSAs, each of which experiences an identical unemployment reduction. Estimates based on
random effects model, with national variables entered into price and wage equation for college graduates. 
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Figure 5:  Effects on Prices of Two Methods of Lowering National Unemployment:               
       Lowering Unemployment Everywhere, and Targeting High-Unemployment         
       Areas
Notes: These simulations consider imaginary United States that initially is divided into two equal size types of
local areas: areas with 8% unemployment, and areas with 4% unemployment, with overall national average
unemployment of 6%. The simulations consider two methods of lowering national unemployment from 6% to 4%.
Method 1 lowers unemployment everywhere by 2%, changing the high-unemployment areas to 6% and the low-
unemployment areas to 2%(“Lowering Unemployment Everywhere”). Method 2 lowers unemployment only in
high-unemployment areas to 4% (“Targeting High-Unemployment Areas”).  All simulations assume that group
unemployment in each area changes in normal pattern as unemployment is lowered. Simulations presented here
are for model in which groups within MSA are central city residents and suburban residents. Results for other two
models are in appendix and are similar. 
Estimated Effects after 10 years of Lowering National Unemployment from 6% to 4%
(pseudo t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
Method 1: Lowering 
Unemployment Everywhere
Method 2: Targeting High-
Unemployment Areas




























               Lowering Unemployment Everywhere
               Targeting High-Unemployment Areas
               Lowering unemployment everywhere, effects on high unemployment areas
               Targeting high unemployment areas, effects on high unemployment areas
               Lowering unemployment everywhere, effects on low unemployment areas
               Targeting high unemployment areas, effects on low unemployment areasA-1
Appendix
This appendix presents some additional results, beyond those discussed in the main text.
Appendix Table A1 presents the coefficient estimates from the three random effects
models that are estimated. Figure A1 presents simulations from these three models of the effects
of changing national unemployment to various levels, assuming a world in which all local MSAs
are identical. Figure A2 presents simulations from this same imaginary world of two different
methods of lowering national unemployment, differing in how the unemployment reduction is
allocated among different groups. Figure A3 supplements text Figure 5, and presents estimates in
the race model and education model of two different methods of lowering national
unemployment, differing in whether the unemployment reduction is targeted at high
unemployment regions. Appendix Table A1:  Relevant Coefficient Estimates from Final Wage and Price Equation Models, Random National Year 
 Effects
Observations are on MSA/year cell means for variables labor market variables.  Each column corresponds to one of the seven
equations estimated.  Dependent variable for equation is listed at the top.  Second row lists functional form for unemployment used on
right-hand side of that equation.  Subsequent rows list various right-hand side variables and give the estimated coefficients on these
RHS variables in each equation, with t-statistics in parentheses.  All equations also include dummies for each MSA and each year.  Last
row lists relevant F-test probabilities in each equation for variables of a particular type.
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(2.19)Appendix Table 1.  (Continued)
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0.0001 0.0089 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
UR-group   0.7301 0.6225 0.3468 0.3381 0.1409 0.0976
UR-overall 0.0026 0.0469 0.4793 0.0001 0.0010 0.0009 0.0001
Wage-group 0.0035 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
Wage-overall 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0339 0.0001
Prices 0.0001 0.6295 0.0002 0.0712 0.0861 0.0004 0.0001
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Appendix Figure A2: Price and Wage Effects of Lowering National and Local Unemployment from 6% to 4%, in Three Different Random 
 Effect Models, Using Two Different Patterns of Lowering Unemployment: “Normal” Employment Reductions;   
 Equalizing All Groups’ Unemployment at 4%
Effect on ln(price) in Three Models
Effect on ln(real wage) in Three
Models
             Change in ln(price) from normal unemployment reduction
             Change in ln(price) from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%
        Change in ln(real wage) of disadvantaged group from normal unemployment reduction
        Change in ln(real wage) of advantaged group from normal unemployment reduction
        Change in ln(real wage) of disadvantaged group from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%                  
             Change in ln(real wage) of advantaged group from equalizing unemployment of all groups at 4%Figure A2: (continued)
Notes: Figure estimates and table estimates come from estimates of three random effects models. These models are used to simulate effects of  lowering national and local
unemployment from 6% to 4% in imaginary world in which all MSAs are identical. Two different simulations are considered in each model, one in which unemployment of
groups declines normally, the other in which unemployment of all groups is equalized at 4%.
Effects on Local Prices and Real Wages after Ten Years of Lowering Unemployment From 6% to 4%, Two Different Ways of Lowering
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Notes: Disadvantaged group/advantaged group are other race/White non-Hispanic for race grouping; less than college graduate/college graduate for education grouping; central
city resident/suburban resident for geographic residence model. In a normal decline in MSA unemployment from 6% to 4%, each group’s unemployment declines as described in
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Figure A3:  Effects on Prices of Two Methods of Lowering National Unemployment: Lowering Unemployment Everywhere,  and Targeting   
   High-Unemployment  Areas, in Race Model and Education Model
 Race Model Education Model
Notes: These simulations consider imaginary United States that initially is divided into two equal size types of local areas: areas with 8% unemployment, and areas with 4% unemployment, with
overall national average unemployment of 6%. The simulations consider two methods of lowering national unemployment from 6% to 4%. Method 1 lowers unemployment everywhere by 2%,
changing the high-unemployment areas to 6% and the low-unemployment areas to 2%(“Lowering Unemployment Everywhere”). Method 2 lowers unemployment only in high-unemployment areas
to 4% (“Targeting High-Unemployment Areas”).  All simulations assume that group unemployment in each area changes in normal pattern as unemployment is lowered. Simulations presented here
are for two models: model in which groups within MSA are defined by race, and model in which groups are defined by education level.
        Lowering Unemployment Everywhere
        Targeting High-Unemployment Areas
        Lowering Unemployment Everywhere, Effects on High-Unemployment Areas
        Targeting High-Unemployment Areas, Effects on High-Unemployment Areas
        Lowering Unemployment Everywhere, Effects on Low Unemployment Areas
        Targeting High-Unemployment Areas, Effects on Low-Unemployment AreasAppendix Figure A3: (continued)
Estimated Effects After 10 years of Lowering National Unemployment From 6% to 4% (pseudo t-statistics in parentheses), Two Models and
Two Methods
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Note: Disadvantaged/advantaged in race model is “other race”/White non-Hispanic; in education model it is “less than college graduate”/college graduate. 45
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